입증 책임 (철학)

위키백과, 우리 모두의 백과사전.

입증 책임(라틴어: onus probandi, Onus probandi incumbit ei qui dicit, non ei qui negat – 입증 책임은 말하는 이에게 있지, 부정하는 이에게 있지 않다)은 분쟁의 당사자가 자신의 입장에 대한 유효한 보증을 제공하여야 하는 의무이다.

책임의 소지[편집]

양측이 토론 중에 있고 한 측이 상대측이 부정하는 주장을 내세울 때, 각별하게는 상대측이 그 주장에 이의를 제기하였을 때, 주장을 내세우는 한 측은 통상적으로 입증 책임을 가진다.[1] 그것은 히친스의 면도날에도 명시되었다. 칼 세이건은 『특별한 주장을 하려면 특별한 증거가 필요하다. Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence』(ECREE)라는 아포리즘을 제안하였다.[2][3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10]

삼단논법 같은 특정한 종류의 논증은 수학적인 증명 또는 엄격하게 논리적인 증명을 요구하지만, 입증 책임을 만족하게 하는 증거는 대개는 맥락 그리고 공동체의 보편과 관습에 의하여 결정지어진다.[11][12]

철학의 토론은 그 어느 누군가가 특정한 주장에 대한 입증 책임을 가지었는지로 비화할 수 있다. 이것은 「입증 테니스」 또는 「책임 게임」이라고 묘사되어왔다.[13][14][15]

응용[편집]

공개된 담론에서[편집]

입증 책임의 메커니즘은 담론에 참여한 모든 측이 적합한 논거를 들면서 생산적으로 참여할 수 있게 보장한다.[16][17][18][19]

법학에서[편집]

<nowiki /> 이 부분의 본문은 입증 책임입니다.

각주[편집]

  1. ↑ Cargile, James (January 1997). “On the burden of proof”. 《Philosophy》 (Cambridge University Press) 72 (279): 59–83. doi:10.1017/s0031819100056655. JSTOR 3751305. S2CID 170772287. 
  2. ↑ Marc Kaufman, First Contact: Scientific Breakthroughs in the Hunt for Life Beyond Earth, Simon and Schuster, p. 124.
  3. ↑ Craig, William Lane (2008). 《Reasonable Faith: Christian Truth and Apologetics》. Crossway. ISBN 9781433501159. 
  4. ↑ Goertzel, Ben; Goertzel, Joe (2015). 〈Skeptical Responses to Psi Research〉. Broderick D.; Goertzel B. 《Evidence for Psi: Thirteen Empirical Research Reports》. McFarland. 291–301쪽. ISBN 9780786478286. OCLC 896344862. 
  5. ↑ Kaufman, Marc (2012). 《First Contact: Scientific Breakthroughs in the Hunt for Life Beyond Earth》 Reprint판. Simon and Schuster. ISBN 9781439109014. 
  6. ↑ Larmer, Robert A. (2013). 《The Legitimacy of Miracle》. Lexington Books. ISBN 9780739184219. 
  7. ↑ Matthews, Paul (2010). 《Sample Size Calculations: Practical Methods for Engineers and Scientists》. Mathews Malnar and Bailey. ISBN 9780615324616. 2023년 9월 2일에 원본 문서에서 보존된 문서. 2023년 3월 19일에 확인함. 
  8. ↑ McMahon, Sean (2020). 〈Do Extraordinary Claims Require Extraordinary Evidence?〉. Smith K. C.; Mariscal C. 《Social and Conceptual Issues in Astrobiology》. Oxford University Press. 117–129쪽. ISBN 9780190915650. 2023년 10월 28일에 원본 문서에서 보존된 문서. 2023년 10월 22일에 확인함. 
  9. ↑ Sagan, Carl (1979). 《Broca's Brain: The Romance of Science》. Hodder and Stoughton. ISBN 9780394501697. 
  10. ↑ Smith, Jonathan C. (2011). 《Pseudoscience and Extraordinary Claims of the Paranormal: A Critical Thinker's Toolkit》. John Wiley & Sons. ISBN 9781444358940. 2023년 10월 28일에 원본 문서에서 보존된 문서. 2023년 3월 19일에 확인함. 
  11. ↑ Leite, Adam (2005). “A localist solution to the regress of justification”. 《Australasian Journal of Philosophy》 83 (3): 395–421 [p. 418]. doi:10.1080/00048400500191974. S2CID 170261121. [t]he point of articulating reasons in defense of one's belief is to establish that one is justified in believing as one does. 
  12. ↑ Leite, Adam (2005). “A localist solution to the regress of justification”. 《Australasian Journal of Philosophy》 83 (3): 395–421 [p. 403]. doi:10.1080/00048400500191974. S2CID 170261121. justificatory conversation...[is]...characterized by a person's sincere attempt to vindicate his or her entitlement to a belief by providing adequate reasons in its defense and responding to objections. 
  13. ↑ Dennett, Daniel C. (July 1988). “Review of Psychosemantics by Jerry Fodor”. 《The Journal of Philosophy》 85 (7): 384–389 (389). doi:10.2307/2026956. JSTOR 2026956. Fodor is too wise to think his series of arguments can flat disprove the claims of the opposition, so time and again he resorts to claims about shifting the burden of proof, begging the question, outsmarting by embracing the conclusions of reductios, and other exploitations of the rules of the game. The book is a tireless exercise of that philosopher's pastime, burden-tennis. Burden, burden, who has the burden of proof now? Fodor mostly plays solitaire burden-tennis, against an imaginary opponent often personified as Granny or Aunty, which permits him to express the opposition view in terms that suit his rebuttal, without having to address the issue of whether this is a sympathetic rendering of any real opponent's claims. 
  14. ↑ Rodych, Victor (1996) [1986]. 〈Wittgenstein's inversion of Gödel's theorem〉. Shanker, Stuart; Kilfoyle, David. 《Ludwig Wittgenstein: critical assessments》. 2. The later Wittgenstein: from Philosophical investigations to On certainty. London; New York: Routledge. 232–265 (261)쪽. ISBN 0415149150. OCLC 47938413. Thus, in 1991 Wang seems to understand why Wittgenstein rejects GIT, but, apparently favouring the "onus game" (or "burden tennis"), he unfortunately concludes (pp. 257–58) that "the burden of proof falls ... squarely on Wittgenstein's side" because of Wang's own 'principle of presumed innocence'. 
  15. ↑ Abelson, Robert P. (1995). 〈Credibility of argument〉. 《Statistics as principled argument》. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 170쪽. ISBN 0805805273. OCLC 31011850. When research presentations advance claims that many or most readers deem incredible, these claims are vulnerable to severe challenge. In response, there will typically be a rebuttal by the investigator, and then a fresh round of criticism. The burden of proof shifts back and forth between the investigator and the critic in what might be called the game of 'burden tennis'. 
  16. ↑ Goldman, Alvin (1994). “Argumentation and social epistemology”. 《The Journal of Philosophy》 91 (1): 27–49. doi:10.2307/2940949. JSTOR 2940949. 
  17. ↑ van Eemeren, Frans H.; Grootendorst, Rob (2004). 《A systematic theory of argumentation》. Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press. 60쪽. ISBN 0521830753. [t]here is no point in venturing to resolve a difference of opinion through an argumentative exchange of views if there is no mutual commitment to a common starting point. 
  18. ↑ Brandom, Robert (1994). 《Making it explicit》. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 222쪽. ISBN 067454319X. [t]here are sentence types that would require a great deal of work for one to get into a position to challenge, such as 'Red is a color,' 'There have been black dogs,' 'Lightning frequently precedes thunder,' and similar commonplaces. These are treated as 'free moves' by members of our speech community—they are available to just about anyone any time to use as premises, to assert unchallenged. 
  19. ↑ Adler, Jonathan E. (2002). 《Belief's own ethics》. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 164–167쪽. ISBN 0262011921. 
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